Abstract. Witness encryption (WE) is a recent powerful encryption paradigm, which allows to encrypt a message using the description of a hard problem (a word in an NP-language) and someone who knows a solution to this problem (a witness) is able to efficiently decrypt the ciphertext. Recent work thereby focuses on constructing WE for NP complete languages (and thus NP). While this rich expressiveness allows flexibility w.r.t. applications, it makes existing instantiations impractical. Thus, it is interesting to study practical variants of WE schemes for subsets of NP that are still expressive enough for many cryptographic applications.
Introduction
Witness encryption (WE) is a recent powerful encryption paradigm introduced by Garg et al. [GGSW13] . In WE, an encryption scheme is defined for some NPlanguage L with witness relation R so that L = {x | ∃ w : R(x, w) = 1}. The encryption algorithm takes an alleged word x from L (instead of an encryption key) and a message m and produces a ciphertext c. Using a witness w such that R(x, w) = 1, anyone can decrypt c to obtain m. Decryption only works if x ∈ L The authors have been supported by EU H2020 project Prismacloud, grant agreement n
• 644962.
and a ciphertext c hides m if c has been computed with respect to some x / ∈ L.
Constructions of WE. The first construction of WE for any language in NP in [GGSW13] has been for the NP-complete problem exact cover and uses approximate multilinear maps (MLMs). Later, Gentry et al. [GLW14] introduced the concept of positional WE, which allows to prove the aforementioned construction secure. In [GGH + 13], Garg et al. showed that indistinguishability obfuscation implies WE. Goldwasser et al. proposed the stronger notion of extractable WE in [GKP + 13]. While the security for WE is only with respect to x / ∈ L, extractable WE requires that any successful adversary against semantic security of the WE, given an encryption with respect to x, implies the existence of an extractor that extracts a witness w to x ∈ L. Thereby, the adversary and the extractor additionally get an auxiliary input. Garg et al. [GGHW14] have shown that under the assumption that special-purpose obfuscation exists, extractable WE for all languages in NP cannot exist.
1 Zhandry [Zha16] introduced the concept of witness PRFs, which essentially generalizes WE. Zhandry also proposes (CCA secure) reusable WE, which introduces an additional global setup and thus allows to reuse certain parameters. This drastically reduces the size of ciphertexts in WE schemes. We observe that our generic constructions of WE bear similarities to how WE is constructed from witness PRFs. Yet, Zhandry aims at building witness PRFs for any NP-language, where we aim at practical instantiations. All these constructions build upon MLMs and/or obfuscation and are thus far from being practical. To this end, Abusalah et al. [AFP16] very recently introduced the notion of offline WE as a step towards more practical WE. They split encryption into an expensive offline phase and a much more efficient online phase, which allows them to achieve practical efficiency for the online part. Nevertheless, the offline part and the decryption still requires obfuscation and thus cannot be considered to be practical. Besides imposing a huge computational overhead, MLM and obfuscation are still in a "break-repair" state and it is currently unknown if one can come up with candidate constructions being secure under well established assumptions.
Restricting Languages. In concurrent and independent work, Faonio et al. [FNV15] introduced the concept of predictable arguments of knowledge (PAoK). They are one-round interactive protocols in which the verifier generates a challenge and can at the same time predict the prover's answer to that challenge. Faonio et al. show that PAoKs are equivalent to extractable WE [GKP + 13]. Regarding concrete instantiations of PAoKs (and thus extractable WE), they show how to construct PAoKs from extractable hash proof systems (Ext-HPS) as defined by Wee in [Wee10] . Although their approach to constructing WE can thus be seen as related to our approach, firstly ours is conceptually simper and secondly the languages covered by Ext-HPSs are very basic and very restricted, i.e., [Wee10] presents two instantiations; one for the iterated squaring relation and one for the Diffie Hellman relation. It is also not clear if efficient instantiations for more expressive languages can be found. We also note that due to the lack in expressiveness of Ext-HPS as used in [FNV15] , their constructions are not suitable for what we are targeting at. Earlier work on (private) conditional oblivious transfer [COR99, JL09] can be viewed as as an interactive version of (extractable) WE for very specific and restricted languages not suitable for achieving our goals. Finally, [GGSW13] mentioned along the lines that earlier work on SPHFs can be interpreted as establishing the existence of WE for certain restricted languages and an informal sketch of a construction of WE from SPHFs was recently given in [ABP15] .
Applications of WE. WE in general extends the scope of encryption as it allows to encrypt a message using the description of a hard problem and only someone who knows a solution to this problem is able to decrypt. WE is thus intuitively related to time-lock puzzles [RSW96] and WE indeed has been used to realize a related concept denoted as time-lock encryption, i.e., a method to encrypt a message such that it can only be decrypted after a certain deadline has passed, but then very efficiently and by everyone. An approach to realize such schemes from WE and so called computational reference clocks has been proposed by Jager in [Jag15] . Liu et al. [LKW15] also propose to use their WE construction for time-lock encryption based on the Bitcoin protocol. Bellare and Hoang [BH15] proposed to use WE to realize asymmetric password-based encryption, where the hash of a password can be used to encrypt a message (acting as a public key) and only the knowledge of the respective password allows decryption. Moreover, it has already been shown in the seminal work [GGSW13] that WE can be used to construct identity-based encryption (IBE) [BF01] as well as attribute-based encryption (ABE) [SW05] for circuits.
Motivation. While having WE schemes that support all languages in NP is appealing, it is the main source of inefficiency. We aim to make WE practical, but in contrast to offline WE as introduced in [AFP16] we focus on all aspects, i.e., encryption and decryption, to be efficient. Our approach to improving the efficiency is by restricting the class of supported languages from any NP-language to languages that are expressive enough to cover many problems encountered in cryptographic protocol design. In particular, we aim at algebraic languages defined over bilinear groups. Such languages are very relevant for the design of cryptographic protocols as statements in these languages cover statements that can be proven in a zero-knowledge (or witness indistinguishable) fashion using the Groth-Sahai (GS) non-interactive proof framework [GS08] . As we will see soon, our techniques yield a novel way of encryption, where one can encrypt messages with respect to a GS proof so that only the prover, i.e., the party that computed the respective proof, can decrypt. We assume that there are many interesting applications that could benefit from our technique.
Our Contribution. The contributions in this paper are as follows.
-We provide a generic construction of WE from SPHFs and prove that if there exists an SPHF for a language L, then there exists an adaptively sound WE scheme for language L. Thereby, we define WE to provide an additional setup algorithm as also done in [AFP16, Zha16] , since this notion makes the schemes more efficient and more convenient to use in protocol design. -Using well known techniques such as universal hashing and secure symmetric encryption schemes, we obtain a WE scheme for messages of arbitrary length. -We present practical instantiations of our generic approach to WE for algebraic languages in the bilinear group setting. We, thereby, achieve compatibility with statements from the GS proof system. Besides being practically efficient, our constructions only require standard assumptions (i.e., DLIN).
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-We observe that the existing security notions for WE are unsuited when using WE in combination with other primitives. To this end, we introduce a stronger security notion for WE which considers the combination of WE with GS proofs and prove that our instantiation satisfies this notion. -We present an approach to use our WE construction for GS statements to elegantly encrypt messages with respect to NIZK/NIWI proofs for statements in the frequently used GS proof system so that only the one who computed the proof can decrypt. This yields a novel way of encryption. -To illustrate the aforementioned concept, we discuss two potential applications of our techniques in the context of privacy preserving exchange of information.
Related Work. SPHFs (denoted as hash proof systems) were initially used to construct CCA2 secure public key encryption [CS98] without requiring the random oracle heuristic. Later it was observed that SPHFs are sufficient to construct such encryption schemes [CS02] . They use the SPHF exactly the other way round as we use it, i.e., in their setting decryption is done with the knowledge of the hashing key and without the witness. This paradigm can also be viewed as an implicit construction of publicly evaluable pseudorandom functions [CZ14] .
Hybrid Encryption. Kurosawa and Desmedt [KD04] used the paradigm described above for hybrid encryption. A series of works follow their paradigm (e.g., [KPSY09] ) and use SPHFs to obtain CCA2 secure hybrid encryption schemes. Similar to [CS02] , they use the SPHF exactly the other way round as we are going to use it.
Key-Exchange. A line of work following Gennaro and Lindell [GL06] uses SPHFs for password-based authenticated key exchange (PAKE) between two parties. This concept was later extended to one-round PAKE [KV11] and generalized to language-authenticated key exchange (LAKE) for various algebraic languages over bilinear groups in [BBC + 13a] (and we note that follow-up work on various aspects exists). Most recently, in [BC16] it was shown how to construct so called structure preserving SPHFs, which can use GS proofs as witnesses. Even though this may sound somewhat related to our work, apart from not constructing WE, the approach in [BC16] to build SPHFs is diametrically opposed to our approach. In particular, our WE approach requires GS proofs to be public and that they must not to be useful to reconstruct the hash value. So, applying our approach to construct WE to the SPHFs in [BC16] does not help us.
Preliminaries
Let x ← R X denote the operation that picks an element x uniformly at random from X. We use [n] to denote the set {1, . . . , n}. By y ← A(x), we denote that y is assigned the output of the potentially probabilistic algorithm A on input x and fresh random coins and we write Pr[Ω : E] to denote the probability of an event E over the probability space Ω. A function : N → R + is called negligible if for all c > 0 there is a k 0 such that (k) < 1/k c for all k > k 0 . We use to denote such a negligible function.
Definition 1 (Bilinear Map). Let G = g and G T be cyclic groups of prime order p. A bilinear map e : G × G → G T is an efficiently computable map, where it holds for all (a, b) ∈ Z 2 p that e(g a , g b ) = e(g, g) ab , and e(g, g) = 1.
We typeset G T elements in boldface, e.g., g = e(g, g). Besides the symmetric (Type-1) setting presented above, one can use the asymmetric setting (Type-2 or Type-3). Here, the bilinear map is defined with respect to two different source groups, i.e., e : G 1 ×G 2 → G T with G 1 = G 2 . In the Type-2 setting an efficiently computable isomorphism ψ : G 2 → G 1 exists, whereas such an isomorphism is unknown for the Type-3 setting. Although we have chosen to present our results in the Type-1 setting, it is important to note that our results translate to the asymmetric setting. Such translations can already be nicely automated [AGH15] .
Definition 2 (Bilinear Group Generator). Let BGGen be an algorithm which takes a security parameter κ and generates a bilinear group BG = (p, G, G T , e, g) in the Type-1 setting, where the common group order of G and G T is a prime p of bitlength κ, e is a pairing and g is a generator of G.
Definition 3 (Decision Linear Assumption). Let BG ← BGGen(1 κ ). The DLIN assumption states that for all PPT adversaries A there is a negligible function (·) such that:
Universal Hashing. Subsequently, we recall the notion of families of universal hash functions and the leftover hash lemma [HILL99] . We, thereby, align our definitions with [KPSY09] and allow arbitrary domains X for the hash functions.
Definition 4 (Universal Hash Function Family). Let H = {H y } y∈{0,1} k be a family of hash functions H y : {0, 1} k ×X → {0, 1} indexed by a key y ∈ {0, 1} k . H is universal, if for all x ∈ X , x ∈ X \ {x} it holds that
Lemma 1 (Leftover Hash Lemma). Let X be a random variable with support X , let δ ≥ − log(max x∈X Pr[X = x]) and let H be a family of universal hash functions H y : {0, 1} k × X → {0, 1} . Then, for any H y ← R H, we have that
Symmetric Encryption. We adapt the notion for symmetric encryption schemes Σ from [KL07] . Analogous to [KD04], we do not explicitly model a key generation algorithm and treat the keys as uniformly random bitstrings {0, 1} Σ,κ .
Definition 5 (Symmetric Encryption Scheme). A symmetric encryption scheme Σ is a tuple of PPT algorithms which are defined as follows:
Enc(k, m) : Takes a key k and a message m as input and outputs a ciphertext c. Dec(k, c) : Takes a key k and a ciphertext c as input and outputs a message m or ⊥.
We require Σ to be correct and to provide ciphertext indistinguishable in the presence of an eavesdropper (IND-EAV; clearly implied by IND-CPA and IND-CCA2). The respective definitions are provided in Appendix A. ] proofs are non-interactive witness-indistinguishable (NIWI) and zeroknowledge (NIZK) proofs for the satisfiability of various types of equations defined over bilinear groups. We require proofs for the satisfiability of pairing product equations (PPEs) in the DLIN setting of the form
where
, and t T ∈ G T are public constants. To conduct a proof, one commits to the vectors (X i ) i∈ [m] and (Y i ) i∈ [n] , and uses the commitments instead of the actual values in the PPE. Loosely speaking, the proof π is used to "cancel out" the randomness used in the commitments. However, this does not directly work when using the groups G and G T , but requires to project the involved elements to the vector spaces G 3 and G
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T in the DLIN setting by using the defined projection maps and to prove the satisfiability of the PPE using the projected elements and corresponding bilinear map F :
T . More precisely, a GS proof for a PPE allows to prove knowledge of a witness
Definition 6. A non-interactive proof system Π is a tuple of PPT algorithms which are defined as follows:
Takes a security parameter κ as input, and outputs a bilinear group description BG. CRSGen(BG) : Takes a bilinear group description BG as input, and outputs a common reference string crs. Proof(BG, crs, x, w) : Takes a bilinear group description BG, a common reference string crs, a statement x, and a witness w as input, and outputs a proof π.
Verify(BG, crs, x, π) : Takes a bilinear group description BG, a common reference string crs, a statement x, and a proof π as input. It outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1}.
Since we do not explicitly require the security properties here, we omit them and refer the reader to [GS08] at this point.
Smooth Projective Hashing
A family of smooth projective hash functions (SPHFs) indexed by parameters pp for some family of languages {L pp,aux ⊂ X pp } aux∈A and associated witness relations {R pp,aux } aux∈A , mapping onto R pp informally works as follows.
3 The hash value can be computed in two ways: (1) Using the hashing key hk one can compute a hash value for every x ∈ X pp . (2) Using the projection key hp, one can compute a hash value for every word x and auxiliary information aux ∈ A where x ∈ L pp,aux . This method, besides x, also requires a witness w such that R pp,aux (x, w) = 1 to compute the hash value. Thereby, both methods yield the same hash value for any x ∈ L pp,aux . Below we provide a formal definition of SPHFs, where we closely follow [ACP09] . For brevity, we henceforth use SPHF to refer to a family of SPHFs indexed by parameters pp.
Definition 7. An SPHFfor a family of languages {L pp,aux } aux∈A is a tuple of the following PPT algorithms:
Takes a security parameter κ and outputs the system parameters pp. HashKG(pp, aux) : Takes the system parameters pp and auxiliary information aux, and outputs a hashing key hk. ProjKG(hk, aux, x) : Takes a hashing key hk, auxiliary information aux, and a word x, and outputs a projection key hp. Hash(hk, aux, x) : Takes a hashing key hk, auxiliary information aux, and a word x, and outputs a hash value H. ProjHash(hp, aux, x, w) : Takes a projection key hp, auxiliary information aux, a word x, and a witness w, and outputs a hash value H.
A secure SPHF is required to be correct, smooth and pseudo-random. Below, we formally define these properties. Correctness guarantees that everything works correctly if everyone behaves honestly.
Definition 8 (Correctness).
An SPHF for a family of languages {L pp,aux } aux∈A is correct, if for all κ, for all pp ← Setup(1 κ ), for all aux ∈ A, for all x ∈ L pp,aux , for all w such that R pp,aux (x, w) = 1, for all hk ← HashKG(pp, aux), and for all hp ← ProjKG(hk, aux, x), it holds that Hash(hk, aux, x) = ProjHash(hp, aux, x, w).
Smoothness requires that for any aux ∈ A, the hash value looks statistically random for any word x / ∈ L pp,aux .
Definition 9 (Smoothness). An SPHF for a family of languages {L pp,aux } aux∈A is smooth if for all security parameters κ, for all pp ← Setup(1 κ ), for all aux ∈ A, and for all x ∈ L pp,aux it holds that:
where hk ← HashKG(pp, aux) and ≈ denotes statistical indistinguishability.
Intuitively pseudorandomness requires that for all aux ∈ A the two distributions considered above remain computationally indistinguishable for random x ∈ L pp,aux . We formally model this using the notion below.
Definition 10 (Pseudorandomness). An SPHF for language {L pp,aux } aux∈A is pseudorandom if for all security parameters κ, for all aux ∈ A it holds that:
where hk ← HashKG(pp, aux) and ≈ denotes computational indistinguishability.
Remark 1. It is easy to see that pseudorandomness is implied by smoothness for families of languages where the subset membership problem is hard, i.e., families of languages {L pp,aux } aux∈A where it is intractable for any aux ∈ A to distinguish a word in L pp,aux from a word in X pp \ L pp,aux .
Witness Encryption
WE was initially defined in [GGSW13] and refined by a stronger adaptive soundness notion in [BH13, BH15] where the word output by the adversary may depend on the parameters pp. In our context only adaptive soundness is meaningful as we define WE schemes for families of languages indexed by pp, i.e., the language is not fixed before the parameters pp are generated. For brevity, we subsequently simply use "WE scheme" to denote such a scheme. Since it is beneficial regarding practical efficiency and more suitable for the use of WE in the design of cryptographic protocols, we follow [AFP16, Zha16] and define WE with respect to a setup.
Definition 11. A WE scheme is a tuple of PPT algorithms defined as follows:
Takes a security parameter κ and outputs public parameters pp. Enc(pp, x, m) : Takes public parameters pp, some word x and a message m as input and outputs a ciphertext c. Dec(w, c) : Takes a witness w and a ciphertext c as input and outputs a message m or ⊥.
We require a WE scheme to be correct and adaptively sound, as defined below.
Definition 12 (Correctness).
A WE scheme is correct, if for all κ, for all pp ← Setup(1 κ ), for all m, for all x ∈ L pp , and for all witnesses w such that R pp (x, w) = 1, it holds that Dec(w, Enc(pp, x, m)) = m.
Definition 13 (Adaptive Soundness). A WE scheme is adaptively sound, if for all PPT adversaries A there is a negligible function (·) such that for all x / ∈ L pp it holds that
We call a WE scheme secure if it is correct and adaptively sound.
Remark 2. We note that assuming adaptive soundness of the WE scheme and that the subset-membership problem is hard for domain X pp and language L pp,aux , i.e., the probability of a distinguisher can be bound by (κ), one can use a standard hybrid argument to show that the probability to break adaptive soundness for a random x ∈ L pp,aux is bounded by (κ).
We, however, stress that adaptive soundness is not sufficient to reach our goals, i.e., to encrypt with respect to a GS proof. To this end, will later define and prove a stronger security notion for our WE construction from SPHFs (cf. Definition 14 and Theorem 4).
Generic Construction of Bit WE from SPHFs
We are now ready to present our generic construction of a WE scheme from any SPHF. We start with a bit encryption WE scheme (cf. Scheme 1), i.e., we assume the message space M = {0, 1}. For our construction, it turns out that we only need to assume the existence of SPHFs. We achieve this by using an approach similar to the idea of encrypting bits in the GM encryption scheme [GM84] . In Scheme 1: WE scheme for bits from SPHFs particular, we use the fact that without knowledge of hk and a witness w for x it is hard to distinguish a hash value from a uniformly random element in the range R pp of the SPHF. Now, if m = 0, then the ciphertext is a randomly sampled element from the range R pp , whereas, if m = 1, the ciphertext is the correctly computed hash value. Knowledge of a witness w then allows to recompute the hash value using hp (also included in the ciphertext) and consequently to decide whether m = 0 or m = 1 has been encrypted.
Theorem 1 (proven in Appendix B.1). If SPHF is correct and smooth, then Scheme 1 is secure.
Extension to Messages of Arbitrary Length
To obtain a WE scheme for arbitrary message lengths we apply a well known paradigm from hybrid encryption to Scheme 1. In Scheme 2 we present a construction that besides an SPHF requires a universal hash function family H and a weakly secure symmetric encryption scheme Σ (only requiring IND-EAV security). Our construction works as follows. It uses a universal hash function H ∈ H on the hash value of the SPHF as a randomness extractor to obtain an encryption key for Σ. Note that for the languages we have in mind (group-dependent languages) one could also use alternative extractors such as [CFPZ09] . Furthermore, depending on the chosen randomness extractor, it might be required to choose a larger security parameter for the SPHF to achieve the desired security parameter in the overall scheme. To capture this, we introduce a polynomial p(·) which is determined by the concrete choice of the primitives underlying this construction. Scheme 2: WE Scheme from SPHFs for messages of arbitrary length
Theorem 2 (proven in Appendix B.2). If SPHF is correct and smooth, H is a family of universal hash functions H : R pp → {0, 1} Σ,κ , the symmetric encryption scheme Σ is correct and IND-EAV secure, and p(·) is such that 2 ( Σ,κ −α) /2 , with α = − log( 1 /|Rpp|), is negligible in κ, then Scheme 2 is secure.
Efficient SPHFs for Algebraic Languages
Recent expressive SPHFs are mostly constructed to be compatible with the universal composability (UC) framework [Can01] . Such constructions (see, e.g.,
[BBC + 13a]) usually build upon SPHFs based on CCA2 secure (labeled) CramerShoup encryption, and, consequently, often trade maximum efficiency for UC security. We do not aim for UC compatibility, as we focus on constructing particularly efficient instantiations of WE. Additionally, we want to achieve compatibility with the GS proof framework, as our goal is to be able to encrypt with respect to a GS proof. Subsequently, we will gradually develop an SPHF in line with these goals. We start with an SPHF being compatible with GS commitments and then extend this SPHF to cover languages for the satisfiability of PPEs.
In Appendix C we present alternative SPHFs, which can be used when GS compatibility is not required.
SPHF for Linear Groth-Sahai Commitments
Let the language for the SPHF be defined by the commitments used within the GS proof framework, which we exemplify for the DLIN setting. This brings us one step closer to our final goal, i.e., to be able to encrypt with respect to a statement proven using the GS proof framework. Before we present our construction, we introduce some additional notation. Let :
denote binary operations on row vectors, i.e., denotes entry-wise multiplications, whereas • denotes entry-wise exponentiation. Linear GS Commitments. We first recall how a linear GS commitment is formed. Let (U 1 , U 2 , U 3 ) ∈ G 3 × G 3 × G 3 be the commitment parameters for the DLIN setting, which look as follows:
where ρ, ν ← R Z p . If the commitment parameters are set up in this way, one obtains perfectly binding commitments. In contrast, in the perfectly hiding setup we have that log g U 3 / ∈ span(log g U 1 , log g U 2 ). The two setups are computationally indistinguishable under DLIN. Thus, we can align our further explanations to the perfectly binding setup and they equally apply to the perfectly hiding case. To commit to a message M ∈ G one chooses r 1 , r 2 , r 3 ← R Z p and computes
Observe that C M linearly encrypts M with respect to ((r 1 + ρr 3 ), (r 2 + νr 3 )).
In Scheme 3, we present the SPHF for linear GS commitments, which borrows construction ideas from [GL06] .
Theorem 3 (proven in Appendix B.3). If the DLIN assumption holds, then the SPHF in Scheme 3 is secure.
Extending Supported Languages
Now, to achieve the desired compatibility with statements of the satisfiability of PPEs proven in the GS proof framework, we extend the SPHF for linear 2 , M · g r 1 +r 2 +r 3 (ρ+ν) ), compute and return hp ← (pp, hp 1 , hp 2 , hp 3 ) = (g
. Hash(hk, aux, x) : On input of hk = (pp, η, θ, ζ), aux = M ∈ G and x = CM ∈ G 3 , where CM = (u, v, e), compute and return H ← u η v θ ( e /M) ζ . ProjHash(hp, aux, x, w) : On input of hp, aux, x and w = (r1, r2, r3), compute and return H ← hp
Scheme 3: SPHF for the language of linear GS commitments GS commitments from the previous section. We therefore, borrow ideas from [BBC + 13a, BBC + 13b]. Our framework is compatible with PPEs of the form
where X i , Y i and Z i remain secret and are encrypted using linear encryption. For the ease of presentation, we use the following simplified equation:
Note that in a Type-1 setting, this simplification does not even influence the expressiveness. We denote the commitments to Y i and Z i , respectively, as 
) and we define
Lemma 2. Using the SPHFin Scheme 3 as described above yields a secure SPHF for any language covered by Equation (3).
We prove Lemma 2 in Appendix B.4 and note that an extension to statements of the form in Equation (2) can be done analogous to [BBC + 13a, BBC + 13b].
Encrypting With Respect to a Groth-Sahai Proof
Assume that a prover conducts a GS proof π for the satisfiability of some PPE. Such a proof contains commitments to the witness together with some additional group elements used to "cancel out" the randomness in the commitments. Now, given such a proof π, one can encrypt a message with respect to π using our WE instantiated with the SPHF in Equation (4). The witness to decrypt is the randomness which was used in the commitments contained in π, and consequently the entity who produced π can decrypt. Scheme 4 compactly sketches our approach, where GS refers to the GS proof system and PPE refers to a paring product equation that can be expressed in our SPHF framework from Section 4. We assume that GS.BGGen and GS.CRSGen have already been run and thus the bilinear group description BG as well as the CRS crs are available to both, the encryptor and the decryptor. Again, for simplicity, we use PPEs of the form in Equation (3) without the Z i values. We
Decryptor Encryptor
Scheme 4: Encryption of a message with respect to a GS proof write a GS proof π as a sequence of commitments (C i ) i∈[n] , a corresponding PPE and a proof part π GS . Additionally, we make the randomness r used in GS.Proof explicit and assume that one can efficiently derive the randomness r com used in the commitments (C i ) i∈ [n] in π from r. Then, words in the language L pp,PPE in the WE scheme consist of the commitments (C i ) i∈[n] to the unrevealed values (Y i ) i∈ [n] . Membership in L pp,PPE is witnessed by r com .
Remark 3. One might be inclined to think that it would be sufficient to take just a single GS commitment from a proof π together with the SPHF from Scheme 2. However, then the encryptor would be required to know the value of the Y i corresponding to the commitment, i.e., a part of the witness used in the GS proof, which is contrary to using GS in the first place. In contrast, for the solution we propose knowing B is sufficient.
To formally capture the security we would expect when using WE in this context, we introduce the following definition. Informally, we require that breaking adaptive soundness remains intractable even if the statement is in fact in L pp,PPE and a GS proof for this fact is provided. 
Definition 14 (Pseudo-Randomness in the Presence of Proofs
Theorem 4 (proven in Appendix B.5). When instantiating Scheme 4 with a WE scheme based on the SPHF from Equation (4), the DLIN assumption holds, and there is more than one possible witness for the statement, then Scheme 4 provides pseudo-randomness in the presence of proofs.
Discussion and Applications
We want to emphasize that our techniques are very efficient, and, thus, also appealing from a practical point of view: Counting the expensive operations in G, the SPHF for linear Groth-Sahai commitments in Scheme 3 boils down to 6 exponentiations in ProjKG and 3 exponentiations in Hash and ProjHash, respectively. The operations required when using this SPHF for languages over bilinear groups as demonstrated in Equation (4), are outlined in Table 1 . Thereby, m refers to the length of the vector (Y i ) i∈ [m] , whereas (m − n) refers to the length of the vector (Z i ) m<i≤n . Here, the computational effort grows linearly in the 
size of the PPE (in particular in n and m, respectively) and is almost as efficient as evaluating the PPE with plain values. Regarding applications, our framework is applicable to extend various GrothSahai based privacy-enhancing protocols with encryption features in an ad-hoc fashion. Below, we take a closer look at two potential applications. Ring Encryption. Group encryption [KTY07] is an existing paradigm that can be seen as the encryption analogue to group signatures. In group encryption, a sender can prepare a ciphertext and convince a verifier that it can be decrypted by an anonymous member of some managed group. Thereby, an opening authority can reveal the identity of the group member that is capable of decrypting.
Consequently, group encryption involves a dedicated trusted group manager and provides conditional anonymity, i.e, the trusted opening authority can break the anonymity. Using our techniques, it is quite straightforward to construct a group encryption variant in the ring setting, i.e., an ad-hoc counterpart to group encryption. That is, anyone can encrypt a message such that it is guaranteed that exactly one unknown member of an ad-hoc ring R is able to decrypt. In particular, it allows anyone to encrypt a message with respect to R being represented by a proof of membership of a certain entity in R. Thereby, exactly one member of the ring, i.e., the prover, can decrypt. Furthermore, even the encrypting party does not know who exactly will be able to decrypt. Nevertheless, we can ensure that only the right party is able to decrypt, while nobody is able to reveal the identity of the party that is able to decrypt.
As an illustrative example of ring encryption let us assume that a whistleblower wants to leak a secret to some journalist. Therefore, she needs to establish a secure channel to transmit the secret. Clearly, the journalist might not want to publicly reveal that he is willing to publish critical information leaked by a whistleblower. Using our techniques, the journalist can prove membership in some group of trusted journalists (without revealing his identity) so that the whistleblower can use this proof to encrypt the secret in a way that she has a high level of confidence that only a member of the group will be able to read the secret. Policy-Based Encryption. One could even generalize ring encryption to encryption with respect to arbitrary policies. That is, in the fashion of policy-based signatures [BF14] , a proof that a certain policy is satisfied could be used to encrypt. Mutually Anonymous Key-Exchange. Our method to encrypt with respect to a GS proof could be applied to language-authenticated key exchange (LAKE). That is, two parties that do not want to reveal their identity to each other (but only their membership to potentially distinct groups) can agree on a common encryption key. Note that this goal is in contrast to the goals of private mutual authentication [JL09] or covert mutual authentication [Jar14] , which allows two parties belonging to some managed groups to privately authenticate to each other so that external parties cannot obtain any information about their identities or not even distinguish an instance of the authentication protocol from a random beacon.
A Security Definition of Symmetric Encryption Schemes
Definition 15 (Correctness). Σ is correct, if for all κ, for all k ← R {0, 1}
Σ,κ and for all m ∈ {0, 1} * it holds that Pr [Dec(k, Enc(k, m)) = m] = 1.
Definition 16 (IND-EAV Security). Σ is IND-EAV secure, if for all PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible function (·) such that
where |m| denotes the length of message m.
B Security Proofs

B.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof (Correctness). We analyze the probability that Scheme 1 is not correct, i.e., the probability that if m = 0 and C ← R R yields a value such that C = H. It is easy to see that this only occurs with negligible probability 1 /|Rpp|.
Proof (Adaptive Soundness).
We use a sequence of games to prove adaptive soundness. Game 0: The original adaptive soundness game. Game 1: As Game 0, but we modify the encryption algorithm as follows:
Enc(pp, x, m) : On input of pp, x, m ∈ {0, 1}, parse x as (aux, x ), run hk ← SPHF.HashKG(pp, aux), hp ← SPHF.ProjKG(hk, aux, x ), H ← SPHF.Hash(hk, aux, x ). Sample C ← R R pp and return c ← (C, x, hp, pp).
Transition -Game 0 → Game 1: By the smoothness of the SPHF, the adversary's view in Game 1 is statistically close to the view in Game 0. Game 1 is simulated independent of the bit b and distinguishing it from Game 0 would imply a distinguisher for statistically close distributions.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Correctness is perfect and straightforward to verify, which is why we omit the proof. Adaptive soundness is proven subsequently.
Proof (Adaptive Soundness). We now show that adaptive soundness holds. Game 0: The original adaptive soundness game. Game 1: As Game 0, but we modify the encryption algorithm as follows:
Enc(pp, x, m) : On input of pp, x, m ∈ {0, 1} * , parse pp as (pp , H), and x as (aux, x ), run hk ← SPHF.HashKG(pp , aux), hp ← SPHF.ProjKG(hk, aux, x ).
and return c ← (C, x, hp, pp, H).
Transition -Game 0 → Game 1: By the smoothness of the SPHF, the adversary's view in Game 1 is statistically close to the view in Game 0. Game 2: As Game 1, but we further modify the encryption algorithm as follows:
Transition -Game 1 → Game 2: By Lemma 1, we know that the statistical difference between the adversary's view in Game 1 and Game 2 is bounded by 2 ( Σ,κ −α) /2 , with α = − log( 1 /|Rpp|). Thus, there exists a polynomial p(·) such that the adversary's view in Game 1 and Game 2 are statistically close. Game 3: In Game 2 we are already free to randomly choose the key for the symmetric encryption scheme. Thus, in Game 3, the environment can engage in an IND-EAV game with a challenger C. In particular, once the adversary outputs (x, m 0 , m 1 , st), the environment forwards (m 0 , m 1 , st) to C to obtain the challenge ciphertext from C and use it as C in the simulation of Enc. Once the adversary outputs b * , the environment forwards it as it's guess to C.
Transition -Game 2 → Game 3: This is only a conceptual change. The adversary's success probability in Game 3 is bounded by the success probability in the IND-EAV game of Σ; a distinguisher between Game 0 and Game 3 would imply a distinguisher for statistically close distributions.
B.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof (Correctness). Let L pp,M be the language of linear GS commitments C M to messages M and let pp, hk and hp be generated according to the setup in Scheme 3. In particular, we have
, M ·g r1+r2+r3(ρ+ν) ) and w = (r 1 , r 2 , r 3 ). Let H Proj ← ProjHash(hp, M, x, w) and H Hash ← Hash(hk, M, x), then we have
Proof (Smoothness). To prove smoothness, we can assume that we have an invalid commitment to some message M . Any such commitment is of the form (g
where r 4 = r 1 + r 2 = (r 1 + ρr 3 ) + (r 2 + νr 3 ) and thus not a word in the language L pp,M . With hp = (pp, g
the corresponding hash value is then of the form H = g
Taking the discrete logarithms with respect to g yields log g H Hash = x 1 η(r 1 + ρr 3 ) + x 2 θ(r 2 + νr 3 ) + ζr 4 ,
It is easy to see that the only possibility where log g H ∈ span(log g hp 1 , log g hp 2 , log g hp 3 ) is when r 4 = (r 1 + ρr 3 ) + (r 2 + νr 3 ) = r 1 + r 2 , i.e., when
∈ L pp,M we have that r 3 = r 1 + r 2 and the value H looks perfectly random.
Proof (Pseudo-Randomness). We prove pseudo-randomness using a sequence of hybrid distributions. 
We show that a distinguisher D 0→1 is a DLIN distinguisher using a hybrid sampler, which-depending on the validity of a DLIN instance-either samples from D 0 or D 1 . We obtain a DLIN instance (BG, g 1 , g 2 , g In D 1 we have a distribution as in the smoothness game, i.e., the hash value is perfectly random. D 0 and D 1 are computationally indistinguishable, which completes the proof.
B.4 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof (Correctness). For simplicity, we can without loss of generality assume that m = 1, n = 2. Let (r 11 , r 12 , r 13 ) and (r 21 , r 22 , r 23 ) be the randomness used to compute the GS commitments to Y 1 and Z 2 , respectively. Then, (r 11 , r 12 , r 13 ) and (r 21 , r 22 , r 23 ) represent the witness. The projective hash value obtained using hp is computed as
Computing the hash value using hk yields:
where for the step (i), we use that
2 by definition.
Smoothness as well as pseudo-randomness follow from the respective properties of the underlying SPHF, as we will discuss subsequently.
Proof (Smoothness). For simplicity, we only consider PPE without the Z parts as our argumentation straight forwardly extends to this case (we only consider the discrete logarithms which are the same for the Z parts). We can without loss of generality assume that one of the n commitments contains a value such that the overall PPE is not satisfied. Any such commitment is of the form (g
, where r i4 = r i1 + r i2 = (r i1 + ρr i3 ) + (r i2 + νr i3 ) and thus not a word in the language L pp,Yi . Then, the hash value is defined as:
As the values Y i cancel out via multiplication by B −ζ when plugging in the commitments into the PPE, it suffices to consider
Now h i looks perfectly random as it is linearly independent of the projection keys, unless r i4 = (r i1 + ρr i3 ) + (r i2 + νr i3 ) which only happens if we deal with a valid commitment. This concludes the proof.
Proof (Pseudo-Randomness). We know that smoothness holds. Using the same argumentation as in Appendix B.3 this also implies pseudo-randomness.
B.5 Proof of Theorem 4
To prove pseudo-randomness in the presence of proofs we first prove an additional technical lemma.
Lemma 3. Let DLIN hold, and let Scheme (4)' be defined as the SPHF from Equation (4), with the following modified Setup algorithm:
and return pp ← (BG, pk).
Then, pseudorandomness also holds for Scheme (4)'.
Proof. We prove pseudo-randomness of Scheme (4)' using a sequence of hybrid distributions:
The original pseudo-randomness distribution. Proof. We prove Theorem 4 using a sequence of games.
Game 0: The original pseudo-randomness in the presence of proofs game. Game 1: As Game 0, but we set the CRS of the GS proof system up to be perfectly hiding, i.e., pk ← (g 1 , g 2 , g, g
Now, we observe that-in the unconditionally hiding setting-proofs unconditionally hide the randomness as soon as there are at least two satisfying witnesses for the respective PPE [GS08, Theorem 3]. Thus, the GS proof π does not contain any information about the used randomness (i.e., the witness to decrypt) and what remains is exactly the same distribution as in the pseudorandomness game of Scheme (4)' (which holds by Lemma 3). Furthermore, Game 0 and Game 1 are computationally indistinguishable which completes the proof.
Alternatively, one could also directly prove Theorem 4 in the Uber-assumption framework [Boy08] using the soundness setting together with pseudorandomness under the hard subset membership problem. It suffices to show that the hash value is still indistinguishable from random when additionally given a GS proof for the respective statement. In our setting the proof consists of three group elements containing the discrete logarithms i∈[n] a i r i1 , i∈[n] a i r i2 , and i∈[n] a i r i3 , respectively, where a i = log g A i . Since the (η i , θ i )-parts are independently chosen for each hk i the hash value can (independent of the choice of the values a i ) not be represented as a linear combination of these discrete logarithms as soon as i > 1. Now, given this linear independence, it is easy to see that this distinguishing task falls into the uber-assumption framework, with R = S = 1, x 1 , x 2 , ρx 1 , νx 2 , ρ+ν, (a i ) i∈ [n] , i∈[n] a i ·r i1 , i∈[n] a i ·r i2 , i∈[n] a i · r i3 , (x 1 (r i1 + ρr i3 )) i∈ [n] , (x 2 (r i2 + νr i3 )) i∈ [n] , (r i1 + r i2 + r i3 (ρ + ν)) i∈[n] , (x 1 η i + ξ) i∈[n] , (x 2 θ i +ξ) i∈[n] , (x 1 ρη i +x 2 νθ i +(ρ+ν)ξ) i∈[n] , T = 1 , f = i∈[n] a i (η i x 1 (r i1 + ρr i3 ) + θ i x 2 (r i2 + νr i3 ) + ξ(r i1 + r i2 + (ρ + ν)r i3 )) , where i > 1.
C SPHF for Linear Encryptions
As a basis, we use a DLIN variant [BPV12] of the ElGamal-based SPHF by Gennaro and Lindell [GL06] . Before we continue, we briefly recall linear encryption as introduced in [BBS04] , which is the DLIN equivalent of DDH-based ElGamal encryption.
The setup algorithm chooses a group G of prime order p generated by g. Key generation amounts to choosing x 1 , x 2 ← C M = (pk ζr3 . Taking the discrete logarithms with respect to g yields log g H = x 1 ηr 1 + x 2 θr 2 + ζr 3 , log g hp 1 = x 1 η + ζ, log g hp 2 = x 2 θ + ζ.
The only possibility where log g H can be represented as a linear combination of log g hp 1 and log g hp 2 is when r 3 = r 1 + r 2 , i.e., when C M is in fact in L pp,M . Conversely, if C M / ∈ L pp,M , we have r 3 = r 1 + r 2 and the value H looks perfectly random.
Proof (Pseudo-Randomness). We already know that smoothness holds and we now prove pseudo-randomness by showing that a distinguisher between the distributions considered in smoothness and pseudo-randomness is a distinguisher for DLIN. We obtain a DLIN instance (BG, g 1 , g 2 , g Consequently, if we have a valid DLIN instance, we have a distribution as in the smoothness game, whereas we have a distribution as in the pseudo-randomness game if the DLIN instance is random. Assuming the hardness of DLIN contradicts the existence of such an efficient distinguisher.
C.1 Extending Supported Languages
We can now use the SPHF for linear ElGamal ciphertexts in statements over bilinear groups in a similar way as described for GS commitments in Section 4.1.
Henceforth, let ζ ← 
